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Abstract∗ 
 
This paper aims to present a comparative law study about the enforceability of arbitration clauses in a 
trust, with particular emphasis on the U.S. and Latin American developments and a notion of the issue in 
the international context. Part 1 is an introduction of the topic. Part 2 will discuss arbitration in estate 
planning by providing a brief description of its advantages in comparison to litigation, by commenting on 
different ways to implement enforceable arbitration in estate planning devices and then by suggesting 
mediation as a way to commence the forthcoming process prior to binding arbitration. Part 3 will discuss 
the developments in the United States with binding arbitration clauses in trusts and wills, looking at case 
law, states’ projects and institutional initiatives. Part 4 will address the international experience, 
reviewing international movements toward the recognition of mandatory arbitration clauses in estate 
planning devices and some legislation that officially recognizes the clauses in wills and trusts. Finally, Part 
5 will present a conclusion and my recommendation, regarding the need of legislation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The devastating effects that litigation causes to parties in almost any type of controversy are well 
known. Those effects could range from emotional distress, economic losses or deterioration of 
future family relations. In probate litigation all those controversies are always present and we 
frequently see them in the news, in our communities and even in our families. Estate planning is 
defined as the preparation for the distribution and management of a person’s estate at death 
through the use of wills, trusts, insurance policies, and other arrangements so that he and his 
beneficiaries will derive the maximum benefit during his lifetime and after his death.1 During 
this process it is common and logical for a testator or settlor to include an arbitration clause in his 
will or trust or even for a lawyer to suggest its use. It is a method to avoid litigation, and it could 
be considered a legacy to the heirs. 
 
That is precisely the purpose of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) devices: they are 
means to avoid trials and everything that trials involve and represent. Unfortunately, as we will 
discuss later in this paper, the enforcement by the United States courts of an arbitration clause 
provided in a trust or a will is not clear. But, besides the national response to this premise, it is 
important to take into careful consideration the international developments not only as a possible 
model for progressive legislation, but also as a possible eventual conflict with an international 
trust or an international succession. In the era of globalization and with the mobility of these 
days, it is quite common to see multijurisdictional estate planning.2 This takes me to the main 
point of this paper: the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a foreign trust or in a will 
executed perhaps in a civil law country with property, movable or immovable, situated in the 
United States. This paper will not address difficulties related to trust instrument clauses 
conferring jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the trusts upon the courts of a particular 
territory. The question is: On account of the experiences in the United States and in the 
international arena, can a trust instrument contain an effective arbitration clause in relation to 
future disputes? Moreover, in such case, would it be recommended or necessary to adopt 
legislation governing this particular subject? 
 
 
                                                 
1 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), estate planning. 
2 Jeffrey A. SCHOENBLUM (2006), Multistate and Multinational Estate Planning, 3a Ed., Wolters Kluwer Business; See 
also Jeffrey A. SCHOENBLUM (1992), “Multijurisdictional Estates and Article II of the Uniform Probate Code”, 55 
Alb. L. Rev. 1291.  
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2. Arbitration in Estate Planning 
 
2.1. Arbitration Clauses 
 
The use of arbitration clauses in estate planning devices is not an innovation. In the United States, 
George Washington’s will had an arbitration clause.3 He is frequently cited as the father of will 
arbitration clauses.4 Even Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall, back in 1828, upheld a clause 
that empowered a majority of the executors to decide all disputes arising under a will, later called 
“Quasi-Arbitration Provisions.”5 In other jurisdictions these provisions are also known. Just to 
mention one of them, the Spanish Arbitration Act of 2003, based in the Act of 1988, which 
includes an interesting disposition about Testamentary Arbitration.6 Talking about its origins 
VALLET DE GOYTISOLO, quoting DE LA PLAZA, pointed out as the precedent of Spain’s 
testamentary arbitration that the German Civil Procedure Law, Z.P.D., in §1.048, required the 
application of arbitration rules when the arbitration was ordered in a disposition of last will.7 Big 
steps have been taken favoring arbitration as a public policy, but besides its long history, the use 
of arbitration clauses have not yet been ultimately transformed into a preferred method to avoid 
courts. As Arnold M. ZACK pointed out in 1956 “the historical hostility of the judiciary toward 
the concept of arbitration has been mirrored in the field of decedents’ estates with like results as 
were found in the early cases on commercial arbitration.”8 On the other hand, there are examples 
of arbitration clauses for trusts or wills available, and settlors and testators are using them.9 
Therefore, we can anticipate that controversies are going to arise especially in the international 
arena. 
 
                                                 
3 The Arbitration Clause in George Washington will, established “... that all disputes (if unhappily they should 
arise) shall be decided by three impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity and good understanding; 
two to be chosen by the disputants each having the choice of one, and the third by those two--which three men 
thus chose shall, unfettered by law or legal constructions, declare their sense of the Testator’s intention; and such 
decision is, to all intents and purposes, to be as binding on the parties as if it had been given in the Supreme 
Court of the United States.” Will of George Washington, Transcription, (http://gwpapers.virginia.edu) (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
4 John R. PHILLIPS, et al. (2006), “Analyzing the potencial for ADR in estate Planning instrument”, 24 Alternatives to 
High Cost Litig. 1, 10 [hereinafter PHILLIPS (2006), Analyzing the potencial for ADR]. 
5 Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. 670, 679-80 (1828). 
6 Ley 60/2003 de 23 de diciembre, de Arbitraje (BOE nº 309, de 26.12.2003). 
7 VALLET DE GOYTISOLO (1989), “Comentarios al art. 1059 CC” en ALBALADEJO (Director), Comentarios al Código Civil 
y Compilaciones Forales, Tomo XIV Vol. 2, Edersa, Madrid, 2nd ed., p. 366; See also COGLIOLO (1940), “La clausula 
arbitrale nei testamenti, en scritti varii di privato”, 7th ed 1940, p. 483 quoted by ALBALADEJO (1990), 
“Comentarios al art. 907 CC” en ALBALADEJO (Director), Comentarios al Código Civil y Compilaciones Forales, Tomo 
XII, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., p. 227. 
8 Arnold ZACK (1956), “Arbitration: Step-Child of the Wills and Estates”, 11 Arb .J. 179 [hereinafter ZACK (1956), 
Arbitration: Step-Child]. 
9 See AAA Standard Arbitration Clause; See also Bruce M. STONE & Robert W. GOLDMAN (2005), “Resolving 
Disputes with Ease and Grace”, 31 ACTE J. 235 (Providing four sample arbitration clauses). 
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2.2. Advantages 
 
In comparison to litigation, arbitration in estate planning devices presents a variety of 
advantages. First, most of the people consider the ordinary judicial system to be extremely 
formal. Arbitration provides the parties a less formal atmosphere than the traditional adversarial 
processes. It allows the testator or the settlor to select the arbitrator and the rules that will control 
the forthcoming process or to adopt by reference of the rules provided by the American Bar 
Association.10 Second, court systems usually are overburdened and understaffed. Arbitration 
doesn’t depend on the courts calendar or personnel. An arbitration meeting will be easily 
coordinated, and thus it could resolve disputes in less time than litigation.11 Third, in complete 
concordance with arbitration as a faster more efficient method, it provides a cheaper option to 
litigation.12 One of the main goals of an effective estate planning is avoiding the high costs that 
litigation represents.13 It will be enough to say that “as the litigation rages on, the pie that 
everyone is fighting over shrinks rapidly.”14 Fourth, court hearings are usually open to the public 
and their content becomes part of the public record. The probate process frequently involves the 
discussion of private issues that could be embarrassing to the parties.15 As an author eloquently 
said, parties “…value ‘not airing the family’s dirty laundry’ in public.”16 The arbitration process 
is not public; therefore, it maintains privacy and confidentiality of the process.17 Generally 
speaking, as CAMPISI said, “[a]lternative dispute resolution may be ideally suited for real 
property and probate disputes” and its advantage “warrants increased use of ADR in such 
matters.”18 
                                                 
10 Bridget A. LOGSTROM (2005), “Arbitration in Estate and Trust Disputes: Friend or Foe?”, 30 ACTEC J. 267 
[hereinafter LOGSTROM (2005), Arbitration in Estate and Trust]. 
11 Id. at 268. See also Brian C. HEWITT (1996), “Probate Mediation: a means to an end”, 40-AUG Res Gestae 41 
(Arguing that “historically, probate practitioners have viewed litigation as a roadblock to accomplishing the 
ultimate goal, which is the efficient and timely administration of a probate or guardianship estate”). 
12 Id. at 267. 
13 See Robert WHITEMAN (2005), “Resolution Procedures to Resolve Trust Beneficiary Complaints”, 39 Real. Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 829, 853 (Arguing that lawyers had to work “…hard to achieve a balanced trust administration 
system that will avoid the costs of formal litigation whenever possible by informally solving problems and 
creating workable solutions.”)  
14 Kevin J. PARKER (1998), “Why mediating probate disputes is attractive Alternative”, 16 Alternatives to High Cost 
Litig. 82. 
15 Mary F. RADFORD (2001), “Advantages and disadvantages of mediation in probate, trust, and guardianship 
matters”, 1 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 241, 241-42 (making these arguments as an advantage of mediation). 
16 Id. at 242.  
17 LOGSTROM (2005), Arbitration in Estate and Trust, supra note 10, at 268. 
18 Dominic J. CAMPISI (1995), “Using ADR in property and probate disputes”, 9 Prob. & Prop. 48, 53. 
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2.3. How to Use Them 
 
Parties do not need an arbitration clause in a testament or in a trust to formally refer a dispute to 
impartial arbitration. They could do it voluntarily. As a matter of fact, a majority of the states 
authorize the trustee to use binding arbitration or mediation in probate controversies.19 Under 
this idea, if the testator or the settlor includes an arbitration clause in his estate planning device, 
the parties could consent to submit to binding arbitration. It would represent fewer problems.20 
The problem arises when some parties don’t agree to willingly refer their controversies to 
arbitration. Some authors have suggested that a different road to make the mandatory arbitration 
binding is to include all possible parties (e.g. the beneficiaries, trustee, etc.) in the instrument and 
have them sign it, promising to submit to arbitration any controversy.21 In the United States, the 
arbitration agreement could be made when the controversy arises or in prevention of a future 
controversy. This agreement could also be made in a separate instrument, perhaps a contract, 
where the parties agree to formally submit any controversy to arbitration as a condition of 
accepting the benefit.22 These mechanisms raise other questions, which will be analyzed later in 
this paper. But for now it is important to point out that there is a difference when the parties 
consent voluntarily to binding arbitration and when one or more of the parties do not accept 
compulsory arbitration. 
 
Besides the separate contract method, the testator or the settlor could use a clause analogous to 
the in terrorem or “no-contest” clause. An in terrorem clause is one in a contract or will that is 
designed to frighten someone into compliance with the wishes of another, such as when a will 
provides that if anyone brings a will contest, they will receive only a nominal bequest, even if the 
                                                 
19 See Ala. Code § 19-3-322 (1997); Alaska Stat. § 13.36.109 (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-7233 (2005); Ark. 
Code. Ann. § 28-73-816 (Supp. 2005); Cal. Prob. Code § 16242 (West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-1-804 (2006); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-153 (West 2004); D.C. Code Ann. § 19-1308.16 (LexisNexis 2005); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 737.402 
(West Supp. 2007); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-12-232 (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 554A-3 (LexisNexis 2006); Idaho 
Code Ann. § 68-106 (2006); Ind. Code Ann. § 30-4-3-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Iowa Code Ann. § 633A.4402 (West 
Supp. 2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58a-816 (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386.810 (LexisNexis 1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
9:2121 (2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-B, § 816 (Supp. 2006); Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 15-102 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.7401 (West Supp. 2006); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 501B.81 (West 2002); Miss. 
Code Ann. § 91-9-107 (Supp. 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 456.8-816 (West Supp. 2007); Mont. Code Ann. § 72-34-336 
(2006); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 163.375 (LexisNexis 2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:8-816 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 46A-8-816 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36C-8-816 (2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 175.24 (West 
Supp. 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 130.725 (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-4-3 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-816 (Supp. 2006); 
S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1A-25 (2001); Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-816 (Supp. 2006); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 113.019 
(Vernon 2007); Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-814 (Supp. 2006); Va. Code Ann. § 55-548.16 (Supp. 2006); Wash. Rev. Code 
Ann. § 11.98A.070 (West Supp. 2007); W. Va. Code § 44-5A-3 (LexisNexis 2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816 (2005). 
20 ZACK (1956), Arbitration: Step-Child, supra note 8, at 182.  
21 Timothy P. O’SULLIVAN (2007), “Family Harmony: An All Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate Planning 
Process”, 8 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 253, 314 [hereinafter O’SULLIVAN (2007), Family Harmony]. 
22 Id. at 316. (That “stick” could be a requirement that beneficiaries execute a written consent to the mediation and 
arbitration provisions of the testamentary instrument as a condition precedent to receiving any benefits under the 
testamentary instrument or serving as financial fiduciary). 
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challenge is successful.23 In most of the courts the enforcement of those clauses is limited to cases 
where there is no probable cause for the contest. Actually, that is the particular test provided by 
the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and other Donatives Transfers.24 The standard of proof 
will vary from state to state, and there are arguments to support both positions.25 On the one 
hand it can discourage unmeritorious litigation, but on the other it could inhibit a lawsuit 
proving fraud or undue influence, thus nullifying the safeguards built around the testamentary 
disposition of property.”26 In the case of an arbitration clause, that I denominate a “no court 
contest clause” and it is different from the traditional clause, because the settlor or the testator is 
giving a viable option: binding arbitration. However, it is unclear if a court will enforce the 
arbitration clause, using the probable cause standard. 
 
2.4. The Theories 
 
Cohen & Staff suggests that in order to enforce an arbitration clause in a trust deed the court 
would have to be satisfied: (1) that its jurisdiction is not being ousted (in an unacceptable 
fashion); (2) that the clause purporting to be an arbitration clause is an agreement which is not 
inoperable, ineffective or incapable of being performed and that there is actually a dispute within 
the scope of the clause; (3) that the clause is binding on the party bringing the action which is 
sought to be stayed; (4) that all interested parties are properly represented (including 
unascertained and unborn beneficiaries); (5) that the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable.27 
 
With the emergence of those five elements and it’s analysis, the doctrine has pointed out three 
theories to support the enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause in a trust; they are (1) the 
contractual approach; (2) the intention of the settlor as the law of the trust; and (3) the benefit 
approach, which means that the beneficiaries of a trust had to take the whole disposition 
including conditions and restrictions imposed by the settlor.  
 
The Contract Theory. This theory characterizes the trust deed as a contract. One of the major 
obstacles of the enforcement of trust arbitration clauses is that the general and accepted notion of 
                                                 
23 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).  
24 DUKEMINIER (2005), Will, Trust and Estate, 7 Ed., Aspen, p. 167 [hereinafter DUKEMINIER (2005), Will, Trust and 
Estate] (pointing out that the probable cause rule is adopted by UPC §§2-517 and 3-905 (1990) and by Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Will and Other Donative Tranfers § 8.5 (2003). 
25 Donna R. BASHAW (2006), “Are in terrorem clauses no longer terrifying? If so, can you avoid post-death 
litigation with pre-death procedures?” 2 NAELA J. 349; Gerry BEYER et al. (1998), “The Fine Art of Intimidating 
Disgruntled Beneficiaries with in terrorem clauses”, 51 SMU L. Rev. 225; But see Martin D. BEGLEITER (1994), 
“Anti-Contest Clause: When You Care Enough to Send the Final Threat”, 26 Ariz. St. L. J. 629 (arguing in favor of 
the minority rule). 
26 DUKEMINIER (2005), Will, Trust and Estate, supra note 24, at 167; See also Ronald J. SCALISE, Jr. (2006), “New 
developments in United States succession law”, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 103, 114-115; Jo Ann ENGLEHARDT (1991), “In 
Terrorem Inter Vivos: Terra Incognita”, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 535. 
27 Lawrence COHEN & Marcus STAFF (1999), “The Arbitration of Trust Disputes”, 7.4 J. Int’l Trust and Corp. Pl. 203 
[hereinafter COHEN & STAFF (1999), The Arbitration of Trust Disputes]. 
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arbitration is limited to a contractual view, where the parties willingly agree to submit to the 
pertinent process.28 In his renowned article of 1917, Austin W. SCOTT explains that a trust is not a 
contract.29 In 1986 the United States Supreme Court held in AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of America, that “Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit” and 
concluded that Arbitration is a creature of contract law.30 More recently, in 1995, John Langbein 
proposed his theory of The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, explaining that the conventional 
three-party trust is a prevailingly contractarian institution.31 
 
This paper’s intention is not to go further in this debate, but at this point it is important to make 
three remarks. First, as BOGERT said “there is occasional confusion concerning the legal incidents 
of contracts and trusts.”32 Courts have characterized trusts as contracts under the theory that 
contracts embrace a trust relationship or even saying that the trustee’s obligation was of a 
“contractual nature.”33 Second, in some civil law jurisdictions one of the possible solutions for the 
development of trust legislation, as John MINOR WISDOM said, “is the adoption of the Anglo-
American trust in terms of concepts of the civil law.”34 With this approach, one of the civil law 
institutions that best resembles the trust is the contract for the benefit of third parties.35 Some of 
the legislation tends to see the trust as an agreement or a contract. Moreover, when there is no 
trust legislation it is also common to see this same characterization.36 
                                                 
28 See David HAYTON (2006), “Future trends in international trust planning”, 13 J. Int’l Trust and Corp. Pl. 55 
[hereinafter HAYTON (2006), Future trends] (“The problem with arbitration is the need for an arbitration 
agreement defined in the English Arbitration Act 1996, s 6(1)”); Contrast Jonathan R. MACEY (1999), “Fiduciary 
Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective”, 
84 Cornell L. Rev. 1266 (Concluding that fiduciary duties are essentially contractual in nature) with Fitz GIBBON 
(1999), “Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts”, 82 Marquette L. Rev. 303. 
29 Austin W. SCOTT (1917), “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust”, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 289. 
30 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). 
31 John LANGBEIN (1995), “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts”, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 643; See also Frederic W. 
MAITLAND (1936), Equity: A Course of Lectures (John Brunyate rev. ed., 2d ed.) (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker 
eds., 1st ed. 1909) (“[T]he trust was originally regarded as an obligation, in point of fact a contract though not 
usually so called.”). 
32 BOGERT (2007), Trusts And Trustees, The Law Of Trusts And Trustees § 17. 
33 Id. 
34 John MINOR WISDOM (1938), “A Trust Code in the Civil Law Based on the Restatement and Uniform Acts: The 
Louisiana Trust Estates Act”, 13 Tul. L. Rev. 70, 76; See also John MINOR WISDOM (1940), “Progress in the 
Codification of Trusts”, 14 Tul. L. Rev. 165. 
35 Pierre LAPAULLE (1927), “Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts”, 36 Yale L.J. 1126, 1137; See also SÁNCHEZ VILELLA 
(1944), “The Problem of Trust Legislation in Civil Law Jurisdictions: The law of Trusts in Puerto Rico”, 19 Tul. L. 
Rev. 374; Ruford G. PATTON (1945), “Trusts Systems in the Western Hemisphere”, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 398 [hereinafter 
PATTON (1945), Trusts Systems]. 
36 Note (1954), “Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Courts”, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1032 (“Indeed, continental 
writers often speak of “le contrat du trust,” although at common law a trust need not be founded upon a 
contract.”) 
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The third remark is related to the contractual nature of arbitration. As we will examine, there is a 
tendency in some jurisdictions, e.g. Spain, to abandon the traditional strictly contractual or 
bilateral approach of the arbitration.37 An arbitration procedure could be unilaterally enforced. In 
the United States, this extended discussion has focused on labor law issues, and the doctrine has 
severely censured the practice, as an abuse of power from the employer.38 Nevertheless, the 
unilateral arbitration provision in estate planning should be considered an expression of the 
settlor or the trustee intention, focused in its particular purpose of getting the better method of 
resolving disagreements. 
 
The distinctions are clear: a trust is not a contract.39 In trust, in contrast with a civil law contract 
in favor of a third party, the third party has a real right to the assets in the trust, not merely a 
contract claim against the trustee.40 Unfortunately, the contract approach revives the trust as a 
contract debate, which “seems to lack viability with respect to wills and most trusts”41 even 
accepting the Langbein theory of the contractual nature of the three-party trusts. 
 
The Intention Theory. The second theory is based on the recognition of the intention of the 
settlor is the law of the trust.42 The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers establish that “[t]he controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a 
donatives document is the donor’s intention.”43 Moreover, the Uniform Trust Code defines 
‘Terms of a Trust’ as the manifestation of the settlor’s intent regarding a trust’s provisions as 
expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established by other evidence that would be 
admissible in a judicial proceeding.44 The settlor creates the trust and the created relationship will 
                                                 
37 See Carmen GARCÍA PÉREZ (1999), El Arbitraje Testamentario, Tirant, p. 455 [hereinafter GARCÍA PÉREZ (1999) , El 
Arbitraje Testamentario]. 
38 See generally Anthony N. DILEO (2003), “The Enforceaability of Arbitration Agreements by and Against 
Nonsignatories”, 2 J. Am. Arb. 31. 
39 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS (1999), “Trust and the Civil Law: The Louisiana Experience”, in Vernon VALENTINE PALMER 
(EDITOR), Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction, Carolina Academic Press, 1999, p. 221 (Holding that “[t]he 
trust is created through a unilateral declaration of will made by the settlor. The trust is not a contract; there is 
neither offer nor acceptance.”). 
40 James GORDLEY (2000), “The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business”, 88 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1815, 1868-69 [hereinafter GORDLEY (2000), The Common Law in the Twentieth Century]. 
41 Robert W. GOLDMAN (2007), “Simplified Trial Resolution: High Quality Justice in a Kinder, Faster 
Environment”, 41st Annual Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning, Chapter 16, p. 16-5, June 2007, University of 
Miami School of Law, Lexisnexis [hereinafter GOLDMAN (2007), Simplified Trial Resolution]. 
42 E. Gary SPITKO (1999), “Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian 
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration”, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 275, 294-97 (proposing testator-
compelled arbitration of will challenges to protect a nonconforming testator’s testamentary freedom). 
43 The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 (2001); accord Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 4 (2003). 
44 Uniform Trust Code § 103; See Alan NEWMAN (2005), “The Intention of the Settlor under the Uniform Trust 
Code: Whose Property is it, Anyway?”, 38 Akron L. Rev. 649, 705.  
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implement the settlor’s intention. That is the purpose of the deed of trust, to implement the 
“settlor’s donative intent.”45 Trust legislation is normally subsidiary, and most of the rules 
primarily apply only in the obvious absence of a clear intention. “Trust law consists almost 
entirely of default rules.”46 Therefore, the intention theory proposes that an express condition 
requiring the subsequent implementation of mandatory arbitration to resolve any controversy 
should be valid and enforceable. Of course, imposed conditions have to be lawful and not 
contrary to public policy, but an arbitration clause, generally speaking, is not against public 
policy.47 On settlor’s autonomy, mandatory rules have to be considered. LANGBEIN divided the 
mandatory rules into two groups: “intent-defeating rules that restrict the settlor’s autonomy, and 
intent-serving rules whose purpose is to discern and implement the settlor’s true intent.”48 The 
intent-defeating rules serve an anti-dead-hand policy, and as variations of this rule, LANGBEIN 
states “the benefit-the-beneficiaries requirement and the rules allowing courts to modify trusts in 
response to changed circumstances.”49 Applying the regulatory limitation, mentioned by 
LANGBEIN, to the binding arbitration trust clause discussion, it could be argued that the 
arbitration approach is clearly in favor of the beneficiaries, as demonstrated by its advantages. In 
reference to changes in circumstances the court will always, upon petition, have the power to 
examine the arbitrability of the particular issue as part of its power to revise when there are 
changes in circumstances. 
 
Another limitation, imperative in a comparative approach, is the forced heirship rules as 
restrictions of the disposition.50 Where such restrictions exist, “the possibilities for having a 
dispute resolved before an arbitration tribunal are limited.”51 In the United States only Louisiana 
retains some type of forced heirship, limited to children under the age of twenty-three or those 
                                                 
45 John H. LANGBEIN (2007), “Trust Law as Regulat.ory Law: The UNUM/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review 
of Benefi Denials under ERISA”, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315, 1336. 
46 John H. LANGBEIN (2004), “Mandatory rules in the Law of Trusts”, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1105, 1126 [hereinafter 
LANGBEIN (2004), Mandatory rules]. 
47 Uniform Trust Code § 105; Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); But see the New York approach in In 
re Will of Jacobovitz, supra. See also Georg VON SEGESSER (2001), “Arbitrability in Estate and Trust Litigation”, in 
Rosalind F. ATHERTON (Editor), Papers of The International Academy of Estate and Trust Law - 2000, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 30 [hereinafter SEGESSER, Arbitrability in Estate and Trust Litigation] (In Switzerland “A 
unilateral arbitration clause in a last will or trust instrument will… not be considered as being contrary to Swiss 
public policy”). 
48 LANGBEIN (2004), Mandatory rules, supra note 46, at 1106-07. 
49 Id. at 1126. For LANGBEIN “the anti-dead-hand principle is fundamentally a change-of-circumstances doctrine.” 
Id. at 1110 -11. 
50 Anthony DUCKWORTH (2006), “Forced Heirship and the Trust”, in John GLASSON and Geraint THOMAS (Editors), 
The International Trust, 2nd ed., Jordans, Chapter 14, p. 711. 
51 VON SEGESSER (2001), Arbitrability in Estate and Trust Litigation, supra note 47 at 25. 
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who are interdicted or subject to interdiction.52 The reason for Louisiana’s approach resides in the 
reality that this state is a mixed jurisdiction, were civil and common law coexist, but in civil law 
jurisdictions the forced heirship, also known as legitime, is quite common. Since arbitration 
restricts the ordinary remedies of states courts, an arbitration clause in a trust deed has the 
impact “…of restricting the heir’s rights, and is thus not binding [on] the heirs with respect to 
their forced heirship portions.”53 
 
An argument that can be made in favor of the intention approach is the importance of the 
settlor’s intention in conflicts of law. For example, Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Trusts 
recognizes that the trust shall be governed by the law chosen by the settlor.54 By analogy, if the 
settlor can choose the governing law he ought to be able to choose arbitration as the governing 
method. 
 
The Benefit Theory. This is the third and final approach to the enforcement of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in a trust. It could be characterized as a complement of the intention theory. It 
states that parties who accept property under a will or a trust impliedly agree to be bound by all 
of its terms, including an arbitration clause. Beneficiaries “must take what the settlor has directed 
and are bound to the form of dispute resolution selected by the settlor.”55 The benefit of a trust 
could not be subjected to a partial acceptance, only taking the advantages.56 A beneficiary takes 
only by benevolence of the testator, who may attach lawful conditions to the receipt of the gift.57 
Therefore, this approach means that the beneficiaries are bound by the fact that the only title 
which they have comes through or under the settlor of the trust.58 
 
 
                                                 
52 Katherine SPAHT, et al. (1990), “The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable “Revolution,”” 50 La. L. 
Rev. 409; See also Kathryn V. LORIO (1982), “Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil Law Jurisdiction with the 
Trust”, 42 La. L. Rev. 1721. 
53 SEGESSER (2001), Arbitrability in Estate and Trust Litigation, supra note 47 at 25. 
54 Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their 
Recognition, and Final Act of the Fifteenth Session, Oct. 20, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1388 (1984); Donald T. TRAUTMAN 
(1987), “Party Autonomy in the Proposed Hague Conference Convention for Trusts”, 21 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R. 547. 
55 SEGESSER (2001), Arbitrability in Estate and Trust Litigation, supra note 47 at 27. 
56 See Tennant v. Satterfield, 216 S.E.2d 229, 232 (W. Va. 1975) (“The general rule with regard to acceptance of 
benefits under a will is that a beneficiary who accepts such benefits is bound to adopt the whole contents of that 
will and is estopped to challenge its validity”). 
57 American Cancer Soc., St. Louis Division v. Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d 858, 864 (Mo. App. 1981). 
58 COHEN & STAFF (1999), The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 27, at 207; See also Charles LLOYD & 
Jonathan PRATT (2006), “Trust in Arbitration”, 12 Trusts & Trustees 18 [hereinafter LLOYD & PRATT (2006), Trust in 
Arbitration] quoting a judgment of DANKWERTS J, Re Wynn’s Will Trust ([1952] Ch 271) that said: “Beneficiaries 
under a will take what they take purely by bound of the testator, and it might be said that, as they are not entitle 
to anything of right apart from provisions of the will, they must take their benefits subject to the conditions which 
are contained in the will.” LLOYD & PRATT argue that “[t]here is no reason why the same rationale would not be 
apply equally to a trust.” Id. 
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2.5. Mediation as an Alternative  
 
Mediation is a process in which the parties resolve their differences with the additional support 
of qualified professional called mediator.59 This process is not adjudicative nor adversarial. 
Instead it is conceived as a cooperative or collaborative one. It depends exclusively in the 
voluntary agreement of the parties, so they can resolve their controversies. In their effort to 
promote mediation, states have tended to enforce it. But the enforceability can only be directed to 
promote participation not to reach an outcome, because there is no way of forcing the parties to 
cooperate or negotiate in good faith.60 If the parties in a mediation do not consent to the 
forthcoming process, they will probably be predisposed not to agree and this predisposition will 
affect the outcome of the mediation. Thus, mediation should not be enforced by a clause in will or 
a trust, but it is recommended, if the parties agree, to incorporate a mediation-arbitration clause 
where the parties will mediate the dispute and then, if the mediation fails, proceed to binding 
arbitration.61 A mediation clause should not be legally imposed, but the settlor or the testator 
could refer to a moral obligation to mediate. 
 
Mediation highlights the significant importance of reliable communication. In addition, it offers 
people new ways to deal with potential future conflicts.62 In probate disputes, mediation has 
been described as a face-to-face, non-confrontational setting where “…the parties put into their 
own words their perspectives and problems and not rely on attorneys or piecemeal methods to 
communicate.63 In the words of MONROE WISNOM: 
 
In the interest of maintaining positive family relationships, strong consideration should be given to 
incorporating a mediation step into the dispute resolution clause. Thus, any disputes arising under the 
trusts will go to mediation and, if the mediation is unsuccessful, only then will they proceed to binding 
arbitration. The goal of requiring pre-arbitration mediation is to engage in a full, dispassionate discussion 
about the dispute in a less adversarial setting, and prevent a minor dispute from erupting into a full-blown 
legal battle.64  
 
                                                 
59 O’SULLIVAN (2007), Family Harmony, supra note 21, at 315 (Describing testamentary provisions requiring 
mediation and/or arbitration as “…a family-harmony-enhancing strategy”). 
60 LLOYD & PRATT (2006), Trust in Arbitration, supra note 58, at 19. 
61 Susan N. GARY (1997), “Mediation and the elderly Using mediation to resolve probate disputes over 
guardianship and inheritance”, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 397, 422. 
62 Ronald CHESTER (1999), “Less law, but more justice?: Jury trials and mediation as meases of resolving will 
contests”, 37 Duq. L. Rev. 173, 198.  
63 PHILLIPS (2006), Analyzing the potencial for ADR, supra note 4, at 9. 
64 Patricia MONROE WISNOM (1995), “Probate law and mediation: a therapeutic perspective”, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1345, 
1360; See also Melissa STREET (2007), “A Holistic Approach to Estate Planning: Paramount in Protecting Your 
Family, Your Wealth, and Your Legacy”, 7 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 141, 163 (Arguing that “Holistic estate planning 
employs the techniques of mediation to ensure that testators are successful in passing on a positive legacy that 
will last for generations”). 
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The benefit of mediation has been recognized by some states with the enactment of legislation 
providing for probate mediation court sponsored programs.65 Excellent outcomes have been 
reported.66 Even so, most of those states only allowed the court to refer probate matters to 
mediation or some other alternative dispute resolution method. Actually, a few years ago 
someone presented “a proposal to add a discretionary mediation clause to the Uniform Probate 
Code.”67 Maybe, that is the road to follow in order to promote the use of ADR methods in 
probate disputes. However, according to the mediation theory, its nature requires the formal 
agreement of the parties, because they are the ones that will reach the final agreement. In this 
respect, the American Bar Association has advised that “…attorneys in the estate and trust area 
must be prepared to advise their clients concerning this method of alternative dispute 
resolution.”68 Similar developments have taken place in the United Kingdom, where the 
Association of Contentious Trust and Probate Specialists (ACTAPS) has developed a protocol 
that includes mediation as a litigation “pre-action” because “…trust and probate disputes involve 
a potentially explosive mixture of personal feelings and money or property claims.”69 Moreover, 
as Behrens said, in the United Kingdom “[m]any trust and probate disputes can and should be 
resolved by mediation.”70 
 
 
3. The Enforcement of the Clause in the U.S.A. 
 
3.1. The Federal and State Governments Move Toward Arbitration 
 
During the last two or three decades, the enforcement of arbitration clauses in general was a great 
concern. Those concerns were dissipated, in part, in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, where the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the stereotypical idea that a litigant would loose substantive rights 
                                                 
65 States that had those programs are Texas; Florida; Fulton County, Georgia; Los Angeles County, California; San 
Francisco County, California;) See Alaska Ct. R. 4.5 (2006); Haw. Prob. R. 2.1 (2007); Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., 
Standing Order 1-04 (2006); Mich. Ct. R. 5.143 (2006); N.J. Ct. R. 1:40-6 (2007); Recently Washington and Idaho 
have enacted Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Acts. These statutes provide for nonjudicial dispute resolution 
for matters relating to trusts and estates. See Idaho Code §§ 15-8-101 et seq.; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 11.96A.010 
et seq. 
66 See in general Ray D. MADOFF (2004), “Mediating probate disputes: a study of court sponsored programs”, 38 
Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 697. 
67 Andrew STIMMEL (2002), “Mediating will disputes: a proposal to add a discretionary mediation clause to the 
Uniform Probate Code”, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 197. 
68 Robert N. SACKS, Resolution of Estate and Trust Disputes Involving Family Business, RPPT (ABA) 15th Annual 
Symposia May 12 to 14, 2004 Seattle, Available at http://www.abanet.org (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
69 Draft of Pre-Action Protocol for the Resolution of Probate and Trust Disputes, presented by the Association of 
Contentious Trust and Probate Specialists (ACTAPS) available at www.ACTAPS.com (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007); 
See also Henry FRYDENSON (2002), “Resolving probate and trust disputes”, Vol. 152 No. 7037 New Law Journal 955 
(Describing the protocol). 
70 James BEHRENS (2001), “The mediation of trust disputes”, Vol. 151 No. 6995 New Law Journal 1183. 
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because an arbitrator, rather than a judge, hears his plea.71 There have been different initiatives 
with the optimistic intent of aggressively promoting arbitration. The federal legislature approach 
was to approve, in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). It’s goal was to change the unlikely 
view, especially courts views, of the judicial system as the only possible dispute resolution 
system. As Justice Stevens said “Judges in the 19th century disfavored private arbitration.”72 The 
FAA was intended to overcome the negative attitude toward private arbitration. But several cases 
decided by this Court pushed the pendulum far beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy 
that strongly favors private arbitration.73 The Second Section of the Federal act requires the 
existence of a contract or an agreement to arbitrate as a sine qua non condition for its 
enforceability. The Act states that any “written arbitration agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”74 
 
In the same way, the states approach was manifested by the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration 
Act (U.A.A.), originally published in 1956 and adopted in 49 jurisdictions, now in its 2000 version 
under the name of Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (R.U.A.A.).75 The primary purpose of the 
U.A.A. is to promote arbitration as a desirable alternative to litigation and to provide uniformity 
in law. There is no doubt about the influence of the U.A.A. in states legislatures. But as with the 
F.A.A., the base adopted for a binding arbitration is a contractual one.76 
 
                                                 
71 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).  
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 131-32 (dissenting opinion Justice Stevens – joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter). 
74 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). 
75 Available at http://www.law.upenn.edu (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
76 See Ala. Code § 6-6-3 (2005); Alaska Stat. § 09.43.330 (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1501 (2003); Ark. Code 
Ann. § 16-108-201 (2006); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281 (1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-206 (West 2006); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-408 (West 2005); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 5701 (1999); D.C. Code § 16-4301 (2005); Fla. Stat. § 
44.104 (2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-9-3 (Supp. 2006); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 658A-6 (2002); Idaho Code Ann. § 7-901 
(2004); 710 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1 (West 1999); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-57-2-1 (LexisNexis 1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 
679A.1 (West 1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401 (2001); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.050 (LexisNexis 2005); La. Civ. Code 
Ann. arts. 3099, 3100 (1994); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 5927 (2003); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-206 
(LexisNexis 2006); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 251, § 1 (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5001 (West 2000); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.08 (West 2000); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-15-103 (2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.350 (West Supp. 
2007); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114 (2005); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2602.01 (Supp. 2006); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38.219 
(LexisNexis 2006); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-6 (West Supp. 2006); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-7A-7 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1998); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-569.6 (2005); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-29.3-06 (Supp. 2005); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.01 (LexisNexis 2000); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
12, § 1857 (West Supp. 2007); Or. Rev. Stat. § 36.620 (2005); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7303 (West 2007); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 10-3-2 (Supp. 2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10 (2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-25A-1 (1987); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 29-5-302 (2000); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.001 (Vernon 2005); Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-107 
(2002); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5652 (2002); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.01 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.04A.60 
(West Supp. 2007); W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-10-1 (LexisNexis 2000); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 788.01 (West Supp. 2006); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-103 (2005). 
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3.2. The Case Law 
 
While there is a strong policy favoring binding arbitration, a court of the state of New York in In 
re Will of Jacobovitz, ruled that arbitration in probate disputes is “against public policy.”77 The 
judgment was not limited to unilateral arbitration clauses; agreements between the parties in 
these matters are also against public policy.78 The New York court based its rationale on an 
interpretation of New York State’s Constitution, which held that “the surrogate’s court shall have 
jurisdiction over all actions and proceedings relating to the affairs of decedents, probate of wills, 
administration of estates and actions and proceedings arising there under or pertaining 
thereto…”.79 As expressed by the Court “virtually all arbitrations would be unconstitutional, as 
most constitutions empower courts to decide litigation.”80 As far as our investigation reveals, no 
other state in the United States has adopted this rationale. Dealing with other public policy 
issues, in In re Trust of Fellman the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an arbitration clause in 
a trust instrument was “…unenforceable as a matter of public policy, to the extent that the clause 
required arbitration of a person’s capacity to revoke a trust.”81 In Fellman the settlor and co-
trustees wanted to revoke a trust that had an arbitration clause. Their nephew, the other co-
trustee, argued that they were mentally impaired.82 Invoking the safeguards of the court 
proceedings in incompetency hearings the forum held that “incompetency cannot be submitted 
to arbitration.”83 
 
In Schoneberger v. Oelze the Court of Appeals of Arizona found that a mandatory arbitration 
clause in a trust was “unenforceable with respect to the trust beneficiaries.”84 The court held that 
this type of clause can not deprive a “trust beneficiary of their right to access the court in the 
absence of their agreement.”85 This means that a settlor may not unilaterally force binding 
arbitration absent the mutual agreement between the beneficiaries. There are two important 
rulings in this case. First, the court distinguishes a trust from a contract, relying on the argument 
that a trust in its nature is not properly characterized as contractual.86 The court stated that “a 
trust does not rest on an exchange of promises and instead merely requires a settlor to transfer a 
                                                 
77 In re Will of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1968). 
78 Id. See also Swislocki v. Spiewak, 273 A.D. 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947); Matter of Kabinoff, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 798, 799 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957). 
79 New York State Constitution, Article 6, Section 12, Subdivision d. 
80 GOLDMAN (2007), Simplified Trial Resolution, supra note 41, at Footnote 9. 
81 In re Trust of Fellman, 412 Pa. Super. 577, 604 A.2d 263 (Pa. Super. 1992) Comented in JEFFREY A. HAEBERLIN 
(1992), “Case Note”, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 753. 
82 Id. at 582. 
83 Id. at 586. See also Ronald R. VOLKMER (1992), “Construction of Trust Provisions by Courts”, 19 Est. Plan. 320. 
84 Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz., 2004).  
85 Id., at 1084. 
86 Id. citing In Re Naarden Trust, 195 Ariz. 526, 530, 990 P.2d 1085, 1089 (App.1999). 
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beneficial interest in property to a trustee who …holds that interest for the beneficiary.”87 Second, 
the court modified the proposition that the law should favor arbitration, when they said that “it 
is more accurate to say that the law favors arbitration of disputes that the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate.”88 In its decision the court relied almost completely on the differences “rather than 
focusing on the underlying similarities between a trust and a contract.”89 
 
Scholars believe that “in view of the growing support for arbitration, it seems unlikely that 
Schoneberger will be the last word on the enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause in a 
trust.”90 I cannot agree more. But unfortunately, in In re Calomaris the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals was faced with a similar issue. This time the arbitration provision was contained in a 
will that established a marital trust, not an inter vivos trust.91 Using Schoneberger rationale, the 
court said that the arbitration clause was not enforceable. The District of Columbia’s version of 
the U.A.A. required "[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a 
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between 
the parties.”92 Moreover, since a will is not a written contract, a mandatory arbitration clause in a 
will is unenforceable. 
 
Both Schoneberger and Calomaris represent an unfortunate step back in the important public policy 
to favor the enforcement of arbitration. Their analyses are limited to a narrow view of the 
contractual theory. Theory that involves more than the simplistic expression that states that 
neither a trust nor a will is a contract. Furthermore, the contract theory is not the only one. In the 
words of Bruyere & Marino “[i]f this ill-advised distinction continues to be the majority 
approach, a substantive change in the law is necessary to ensure judicial enforcement of 
arbitration clauses in trust agreements.”93 
                                                 
87 Id. See also Note (2005), “Arbitration clauses in trust agreements”, 32 Est. Plan. 55 (2005). 
88 Id.  
89 Michael P. BRUYERE & Meghan D. MARINO (2007), “Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to 
Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, but are they Enforceable?”, 42 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 351, 360 
[hereinafter BRUYERE & MARINO (2007), Mandatory Arbitration Provisions]. 
90 DUKEMINIER (2005), Will, Trust and Estate, supra note 24, at 543. 
91 In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408 (D.C., 2006), discussed in Note (2006), “Validity and scope of arbitration 
provisions”, 33 Est. Plan. 54. 
92 D.C.Code § 16-4302(a) and D.C.Code § 16-4301. 
93 BRUYERE & MARINO (2007), Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, supra note 89, at 361. 
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3.3. State’s Initiatives: The Cases of Hawaii and Florida 
 
Clearly, the cases we have just briefly presented do not favour the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses in trust deeds. That means that such enforcement will depend on each state’s policy to 
validate arbitration clauses.94 Therefore, this reality produces uncertainty in this scenario. 
 
In what has been called as “Hawaii’s legislature to the rescue”,95 the Probate Mediation and 
Arbitration Choice Act of 2005 proposed a mechanism for the enforcement of mediation and 
arbitration clauses in wills and trust instruments.96 This bill provides that “[a]n arbitration clause 
in a will or a trust instrument shall be given the same force and effect as to interested parties as if 
the clause was an agreement by the interested parties.”97 It also provides that the existing 
arbitration statutes will govern mandatory arbitration clauses in probate instruments as if the 
beneficiaries, personal representatives, or trustees, as parties to the dispute over the estate, 
agreed to arbitration under the terms specified by the maker or settlor.98 The 2005 effort was a 
sequel of a project originally presented a year before.99 Unfortunately it seems to be that this will 
not be the last time such initiatives come to the consideration of the Legislature, because as has 
been reported the Bill “died in the Judiciary Committee during the 2006 Regular Session of the 
Hawaii State Senate …without so much as a hearing.”100 
 
In what seems to be a promising scenario, effective on July 1, 2007, the State Florida has adopted 
legislation expressly recognizing the enforceability of binding arbitration clauses in wills and 
trusts.101 In its First Section the bill provides that “[a] provision in a will or trust requiring the 
arbitration of disputes, other than disputes of the validity of all or a part of a will or trust, 
between or among the beneficiaries and a fiduciary under the will or trust, or any combination of 
such persons or entities, is enforceable.”102 Moreover, the Second Section establishes that 
“[u]nless otherwise specified in the will or trust, a will or trust provision requiring arbitration 
                                                 
94 Valerie J. VOLLMAR (2006), “The Oregon Uniform Trust Code and Comments”, 42 Willamette L. Rev. 187, 375 
(Asserting that in Oregon “Settlor’s wishing to encourage use of alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide 
it”). 
95 Daniel BENT (2004), “My bequest to my heirs: years of contentious, family splitting litigation…”, 8 Haw. B. J. 28, 
30. 
96 S.B. 1314, 23rd Leg. (Haw. 2005). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Probate Mediation and Arbitration Choice Act, S.B. 2444, 22nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2004) Hawaii 2004 HB 
NO. 2675. 
100 BRUYERE & MARINO (2007), Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, supra note 89, at 365. 
101 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2007-74 (C.S.H.B. 311) (West) FL ST § 731.401; (http://www.flsenate.gov) (Last 
visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
102 Id. 
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shall be presumed to require binding arbitration …”.103 The exception “of disputes of the validity 
of all or a part of a will or trust” resembles the policy issues discussed in Fellman. There are public 
policy issues that should be determined by the courts. The validity of the devise used is one of 
them. 
 
3.4. An Institutional Approach 
 
One of the reasons the Florida Bill was approved is because it was endorsed by the American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC).104 Through its Arbitration Task Force, ACTEC has 
also formulated a model statute to allow the enforceability of arbitration clauses in wills and 
trusts, along with sample clauses to be used.105 They advise that the lack of certainty in the 
enforcement of arbitration mandated by the testator or the settlor is unnecessary, and that an 
alternative to bring certainty to those significant concerns is enacting statutes officially allowing 
them to incorporate binding arbitration provisions as a method, rather than leaving such 
controversies to the court.106 The Report of the Arbitration Task Force includes two different 
Model Act’s, some sample arbitration clauses for trusts and wills and a checklist of significant 
issues that drafters should have in mind.107 They hope that the comprehensive report serves as a 
“launching pad” with the recognition that the Task Force mission is yet to be accomplished. First, 
legislation should be promulgated and then ACTEC should work on the awareness of this 
method as a preferred one over litigation.108 
 
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has adopted the Arbitration Rules for Wills and 
Trusts, as revised September 15, 2005.109 Their first rule says that “[a] testator or settlor shall be 
deemed to have made these rules a part of the will or trust whenever the will or trust has 
provided for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association or under its Arbitration Rules 
for Wills and Trusts.”110 The rules included a sample clause, procedures for large complex 
disputes, dispositions concerning the arbitrators, the hearings, and the evidence, etc.111 These 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) (http://www.actec.org) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007); 
See also Juan ANTUNEZ, “New Florida legislation expressly authorizes mandatory arbitration clauses in wills and 
trusts”, posted 09/26/2007, (http://www.flprobatelitigation.com/) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
105 The Report of the ACTEC Arbitration Task Force was publish in GOLDMAN (2007), Simplified Trial Resolution, 
supra note 41, at 16-27. 
106 Id. at 16-06. 
107 Id. at 16-13 to 16-24. 
108 Id. at 16-27. 
109 http://www.adr.org (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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rules have been around for a while and have been proven viable. As a matter of fact in both 
Fellman and Schoneberger the arbitration clauses refer to the rules of the AAA.112 
 
 
4. The International Experience 
 
4.1. The International Trust 
 
Historically, the trust has been described as a creature of the common law courts of equity. Some 
scholars believe that it was a creature of the Roman Law developed by the Common Law.113 This 
debate have generated an important scholarly discussions, especially when, in a comparative 
approach, they bring into consideration the Roman Law fideicommissum, the German treuhand, the 
Hindu benimi or the Islam waaf.114 The purpose of this note is not to revive the trust origins 
debate or its conflict of law difficulties, but it is important to point out that the trust is considered 
to be so useful that despite of the differences it has spread all over the modern world.115 
Furthermore, in relation to conflicts of law, we should say that there is a remarkably strong 
policy in favor of granting effect to the settlor’s intention, a tendency that also extends to non-
conflict trust cases.116 
the recognition of the international trust, described as “the launch of the international trust”, is 
                                                
 
The recent developments and use of the trust in the international arena has been called by the 
Spanish scholar, CÁMARA LAPUENTE the “Gold fever of the Trust.”117 Its commercial and 
economic flexibility in international commerce is one of the main reasons for its international 
development.118 In this respect, developments in corporate pensions, disability provisions for 
employees, the offshore market of global investments and in the protection of family wealth 
management among others have been key elements in its propagation.119 Another key element in 
 
112 Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1080; In re Fellman, 412 Pa. Super. at 580. 
113 H. Patrick GLENN (1993), The historical origins of trust, in Alfredo MORDECHAI RABELLO (Editor), Aequitas and 
Equity: Equity in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions, Jerusalem Sacher Institute p. 775. 
114 DUKEMINIER (2005), Will, Trust and Estate, supra note 24, at 488. 
115 GORDLEY (2000), The Common Law in the Twentieth Century, supra note 40, at 1869. See PATTON (1945), Trusts 
Systems, supra note 35.  
116 SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES (2000), Conflict of Law, Third Ed. West, p. 1027. 
117 Sergio CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2006), “Breve Compendio Geo-Conceptual sobre el Trust”, in Los patrimonios 
fiduciarios y el Trust, III Congreso de Derecho Civil Catalán, Tarragona, 20 y 21 de octubre de 2005, Monogràfics La 
Notaria, Marcial Pons, p. 25. See also Sergio CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2005), “Trust a la francesa”, Indret, 2/2005, 
(www.indret.com) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
118 See generally Henry HANSMANN & Ugo MATTEI (1998), “The functions of trust law: a comparative legal and 
economic analysis”, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434; David HAYTON (1999), “The Uses of trusts in the Commercial Context”, 
in HAYTON (EDITOR), Modern International Developments in Trust Law, Kluwer law, p. 145. 
119 HAYTON (1999), Principles of European Trust Law, Ed. Hayton, Kluwer Law, Vol. 1, p. 5. 
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the Hague Convention on the Law relating to Trusts and On Their Recognition.120 Several 
countries from the common law tradition have ratified the Convention, including the United 
Kingdom (1989), Australia (1991), and Canada (1992). Signing countries with Civil Law system 
are: Italy (1985), the Netherlands (1985), France (1991), Luxembourg (1985), Cyprus (1998), Malta 
(1994), Liechtenstein (2004), San Marino (2005) and Switzerland (2007), and the Convention has 
been ratified by most of them, with the exception of France and Cyprus.121 Even though there is a 
great debate about the adaptation or recognition of trust law in civil law jurisdictions, great 
advances have been made inspired by the Hague Convention of 1984.122 The purpose of the 
convention “is in essence an effort to unify the international rules of conflict of laws for trusts.”123 
As GAILLARD & TRAUTMAN explain “[t]he Convention endeavors to solve these growing 
difficulties by establishing the rule for determining the applicable law for trusts.”124 It is not a 
trust model act, which states could simply adopt. As Maurizio LUPOI has pointed out “the Hague 
Convention does not require an element of foreignness other than the simple fact that a trust is 
governed by a foreign law.”125 
 
All these developments have brought some uniformity and certainty to the trust industry. Still, 
some countries such as Germany strongly believe that there is no need for trust legislation in the 
Civil Law system.126 Unfortunately, they had the extraordinary possibility to generate 
international controversies, especially when properties in different jurisdictions are part of the 
trust. If domestic trust litigation is expensive and time consuming, in the international arena it 
would be almost impossible to manage international trust litigation. 
                                                 
120 Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their 
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121 http://www.hcch.net (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
122 HAYTON (1987), “Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition”, 36 Int’l & 
Comp. L.Q. 260; GUILLARD & TRAUTMAN (1997), “Trust in Non-Trust Countries: Conflict of Law and the Hague 
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Countries]. 
123 DYER (1999), International Recognition and Adaptation of Trusts, supra note 118, at 991. 
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125 Maurizio LUPOI (1999), “The Civil law Trust”, 32 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 2 (Asserting that trusts are not 
incompatible with the basic assumptions of civil law systems). See also See also Gerwyn GRIFFITHS (2006), “The 
Common Law Trust and its Utility for Civil Law Systems”, in Los patrimonios fiduciarios y el Trust, III Congreso de 
Derecho Civil Catalán, Tarragona, 20 y 21 de octubre de 2005, Monogràfics La Notaria, Marcial Pons, p. 53. 
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International Developments in Trust Law, Kluwer Law, p. 49. 
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4.2. The International Experience with Trust and Arbitration 
 
The use of ADR mechanisms in the context of wills and trusts is well known in many countries. 
Let’s examine a few examples. In the Scandinavian countries, particularly in Denmark it has been 
asserted that a specific provision in the will calling for a certain ADR procedure is likely to be 
recognized.127 In Switzerland, besides the fact that they don’t have trust law, disputes arising out 
of trusts may be subjected to arbitration.128 The Swiss solution would be “to conclude a 
testamentary pact with all the parties concerned” and if it is “not possible to conclude a 
testamentary pact with all the heirs, the testator may consider including in the last will a 
provision which would restrict the non-cooperative heir to the minimum share should he or she 
not respects the arbitration clause.”129 In the United Kingdom, some authors have pointed out 
that it is both desirable and possible to submit a wide range of disputes arising out of or in 
connection with express trusts to arbitration.130 But Professor David HAYTON says that its 
enforcement is questionable, because of the problems with arbitration clauses in controversies in 
which the beneficiaries are minors or unborn or unascertained.131 
 
An essential advantage of the use of arbitration in international trust litigation is the recognition 
of the awards in the international arena. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the “New York Convention of 1958”, establishes 
that awards are fully enforceable in states that have ratified the Convention.132 As of June 2007, 
142 countries have ratified the Convention.133 That way, arbitration proceedings may be 
preferred to court proceedings, especially in international transactions.134 The Convention does 
not have an express recognition of a unilateral arbitration clause.135 However, “it can be used as 
grounds for the enforcement of the award if such a unilateral clause is admissible under the 
domestic law of the country where the enforcement and recognition of the award is sought.”136 
 
Some countries considered the possibility of changing their law to require that, in a case where 
the terms of the trust provide for binding arbitration or other form of A.D.R., the provision 
                                                 
127 Randi BACH POULSEN (2001), “The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution from a Scandinavian Perspective”, in 
Rosalind F. ATHERTON (Editor), Papers of The International Academy of Estate and Trust Law - 2000, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 7 [hereinafter BACH POULSEN (2001), The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution]. 
128 SEGESSER (2001), Arbitrability in Estate and Trust Litigation, supra note 47, at 27. 
129 Id. at 26. 
130 COHEN & STAFF (1999), The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 27, at 205. 
131 HAYTON (2006), Future trends, supra note 28, at 71. 
132 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards (New York 
Convention of 1958, (http://www.uncitral.org) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
133 Várady BARCELÓ & Arthur VON MEHREN (2006), International Commercial Arbitration, Third Ed, Supplement, p. 6. 
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should be binding even upon the beneficiaries who have not agreed to it, and even though they 
are under age, or even unborn.137 But, as we said before, trust arbitration is not a novel issue. A 
good example is the case of Liechtenstein where provisions or clauses enforcing mandatory 
arbitration are law since 1928. 138 In this jurisdiction “the trust deed may provide for compulsory 
arbitration and indeed a foreign trust deed must provide for compulsory arbitration in 
Liechtenstein, for disputes arising between the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiaries.”139 
 
There are different models to address the issue of where it is desirable to include the legal norms. 
Some countries, like Paraguay and Malta, have regulated the validity of a trust arbitration clause 
in the arbitration law. Others, like Guernsey and Panamá, enforce the clause in their trust 
legislation. Interesting approaches related to this issue are the cases of Spain, Bolivia, Honduras, 
and Perú where arbitration clauses in wills are recognized. This approach is important because it 
can be viewed in two ways: it could handle mortis causa trusts, or it can be used by analogy to 
recognize the enforcement of a unilateral arbitration clause binding on the beneficiaries. 
 
The binding testamentary arbitration approach is recognized with some limitations. All the 
jurisdictions considered are based on the scenario of forced heirship, where provisions such as 
these cannot be subjected to any charge or condition, as a matter of public policy. With that in 
mind, let’s examine some cases. The Spanish Arbitration Law limits the authority of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in wills “to resolve disputes between beneficiaries or legatees in matters 
relating to the distribution or administration of the estate.”140 A more specific case is Bolivia’s 
Arbitration and Conciliation Law which also limits the testamentary arbitration for resolving 
differences that arise among heirs and legatees, exclusively regarding: (1) the interpretation of the 
last will of the testator; (2) their shares in the assets of the estate; (3) heirs institution and 
conditions; and (4) the distribution and administration of the estate.141 It is important to point out 
that Article 6 of the Bolivian law establishes, in the general terms applicable to every arbitration 
process, that matters regarding capacity of the people are not arbitral, so the testator or settlor’s 
capacity could not be subjected to mandatory arbitration.142 The laws of Perú and Honduras have 
similar language permitting testamentary arbitration. But specifically in Article 32 Honduras 
excludes mandatory arbitration for any controversies in which forced heirs are involved.143 
                                                 
137 Paul MATTHEWS (2005), “The Characteristics of a Modern Trust and Foundation Law”, Liechtenstein Dialogue, 
October 5, 2007 Vaduz, Liechtenstein, (http://www.dialogue.li) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
138 PGR Art. 931 (1)(2) at Maurizio LUPOI (2000), Trust Laws of the World, Vol.2 Rome, p. 1169. 
139 ArComm Trust Company, Liechtenstein The Trust, In Liechtenstein Law August 22, 2002 
(http://www.mondaq.com) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
140 Article 10, Ley 60/2003, de 23 de diciembre, Ley de Arbitraje; See ALBALADEJO (1990), El arbitraje testamentario, 
Actualidad Civil, 1990, p. 82; GARCÍA PÉREZ (1999) , El Arbitraje Testamentario, supra note 37. 
141 Article 10, Ley de Arbitraje y conciliación N° 1770 de 10 de marzo de 1997 (Bolivia).  
142 Id., at Article 6. 
143 Article 32, Ley de Conciliación y Arbitraje de Honduras, Decreto N° 161-200, (http://www.ftaa-alca.org) (Last 
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There are new silhouettes in the horizon: the appearance of two drafts referring to the 
testamentary arbitration. Those are the cases of Puerto Rico and Argentina. In Puerto Rico, I have 
proposed to include an article in the Revised Civil Code Draft, as one of the modalities of the 
heir’s institution.144 This proposal excludes from arbitration any controversies regarding the 
forced portion or legítima as it is called. The Civil Code Commission, which has been working on 
the Draft for a New Civil Code for Puerto Rico since 1997,145 has adopted the recommendation 
and the revised drafts as November 2007 includes this provision.146 The other project is the Draft 
of 2007 for the National Law of Arbitration of Argentina.147 Article 11 of this draft recognizes the 
validity of a testamentary arbitration clause to resolve only disputes that may arise between heirs 
or legatees regarding “real estate”. 
 
Specific recognition of arbitration clauses in trusts has been adopted in some other legislation. 
Article 41 of the Panamá Trust Law of 1984 recognizes that it can be stipulated in the trust 
instrument that any dispute arising from the trust will be determined by binding arbitration.148 It 
can also be done by establishing the proper rules for the arbitration, and in case that such 
procedure has not been set, the parties should apply the rules contained in the Judicial Code.149 
In Paraguay, Article 44 of Ley de Negocios fiduciarios recognizes the arbitration agreement.150 This 
Article says that the constitutive act may contain an arbitration clause for disputes between the 
settlor and the trustee or beneficiary, regarding the existence, interpretation, development or 
termination of the trust business.151 Like the Panamanian Law, it authorizes the express inclusion 
of the substantive and procedural rules for the arbitration, and in absence of rules, the arbitration 
law will govern.152 
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In Malta, the Trusts and Trustees Act was approved and came into force on the January 2005. As 
part of this reform the Maltese Arbitration Act was amended to officially allow the insertion of 
arbitration agreements in trust deeds and wills.153 Article 15 says: 
 
Arbitration clause in wills and trusts.  
(1) It shall be lawful for a testator to insert an arbitration clause in a will. In such event such clause shall be 
binding on all persons claiming under such will in relation to all disputes relating to the interpretation of 
such will, including any claim that such will is not valid.  
(2) It shall be lawful for a settlor of a trust to insert an arbitration clause in a deed of trust and such clause 
shall be binding on all trustees, protectors and any beneficiaries under the trust in relation to matters 
arising under or in relation to the trust.  
 
In 2007 Guernsey’s draft Projet de Loi, entitled Trusts Law was enacted. In a comprehensive and 
exhaustive norm, Section 63 introduces mediation and arbitration as a means to resolve trust 
controversies in this jurisdiction.154 The Section establishes:  
 
Settlement of action against trustee by mediation or arbitration to be binding on beneficiaries. 
(1) Where -  
(a) the terms of a trust direct or authorise, or the Court so orders, that any dispute between the 
trustees and a beneficiary or otherwise relating to the trust or the trust property may be referred to 
mediation or arbitration,  
(b) such a dispute arises and, in accordance with the terms of the trust or the Court’s order, is referred 
to mediation or arbitration, and  
(c) the mediation or arbitration results in a settlement of the dispute which is recorded in a document 
signed by or on behalf of all parties, the settlement is binding on all beneficiaries of the trust, whether or 
not yet ascertained or in existence, and whether or not minors or persons under legal disability.  
(2) Subsection (1) applies in respect of a beneficiary only if -  
(a) he was represented in the mediation or arbitration (whether personally, or by his guardian, or as 
the member of a class, or otherwise), or  
(b) if not so represented, he had notice of the mediation or arbitration and a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard, and only if, in the case of a beneficiary who is not yet ascertained or in existence, or who is a 
minor or person under legal disability, the mediator or arbitrator certifies that he was independently 
represented.  
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, the mediation or arbitration need not be conducted in Guernsey or in 
accordance with the procedural law of Guernsey.” 
 
This section not only validates arbitration clauses but also introduces mediation and recognizes 
that settlements resulting from any of these mechanisms are binding. It is commonly accepted in 
the doctrine that mediation clauses are not binding. But if an agreement is reached and all the 
parties sign, it will be enforceable. In terms of the beneficiaries, it addresses Professor HAYTON’s 
points regarding minors or unborn or unascertained children, granting notice and reasonable 
opportunity of being heard, and requiring that the mediator or arbitrator certifies that such 
person where independently represented. Last but not least, makes clear that either process could 
                                                 
153 Article 15 of the Maltese Arbitration Act, Added by: XIII. 2004.109 (Malta), (http://docs.justice.gov.mt) (Last 
visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
154 See Russell CLARK (2007), “Commentary of the draft Projet de Loi entitled Trusts (Guernsey) Law”, 6 June 2007 
(http://www.careyolsen.com) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
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be held in Guernsey or outside and, in accordance with its procedure rules or by other rules. This 
flexibility is in complete concordance with the propensity of the international trust. 
 
4.3. An Institutional Approach 
 
These days international trusts litigation represents serious difficulties. With that in mind, in the 
year 2000 one of the topics of the International Academy of Estate and Trust Law was “Settlement 
of disputes in Estate and Trust Matters through Arbitration and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution.”155 Distinguished professors from Denmark, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 
analyzed different approaches regarding these issues. They concluded that in most instances 
arbitration clauses in trusts will be valid and enforceable, but in order to fully recognize it a 
legislative reform is necessary.156 In 2007 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
designated a Task Force to work on Trusts and Arbitration.157 The mission of this group is to 
“Study and identify specific issues related to Trusts and Arbitration and suggest a draft ICC 
model arbitration clause to be included in the trust deed.”158 Later that year, the central theme of 
the 3rd Zurich Annual Conference on International Trust and Inheritance Law Practice, held on 
April 2007, was “Trusts and Arbitration” In this Conference, a group of experts from England, 
the United States and Switzerland discussed the role of arbitration in disputes involving trusts 
and the benefits and possibilities of resolving trust disputes by means of arbitration.159 In other 
developments, the European Convention on the Uniform Law on Arbitration actively encourages 
states to regulate testamentary arbitration.160 The Convention, in its explanatory report, 
comments that “…an arbitration clause in a will may be treated as an arbitration agreement, as 
the result either of a court decision or of a legal provision.”161 In summary, from a general point 
of view, as BACH POULSEN said referring to trusts law, “the future of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution is secure.”162 
 
4.4. Some International Concerns  
 
Professor HAYTON pointed out that in the United Kingdom “it is considered that the settlor’s 
trust instrument cannot normally amount to an ‘arbitration agreement’ capable of leading to an 
                                                 
155 See in general Rosalind F. ATHERTON (Editor), Papers of The International Academy of Estate and Trust Law - 2000, 
Kluwer Law International. 
156 Id. 
157 The Task Force on Trusts and Arbitration is Co-chaired by Bruno W. Boesch (Switzerland) and Alexis Mourre 
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158 Id. 
159 http://www.unizh.ch (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
160 European Convention providing a uniform law on arbitration Commentary on Annex I Article 1, 
(http://conventions.coe.int) (Last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
161 Id.  
162 BACH POULSEN (2001), The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 127, at 10. 
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‘arbitration award’ enforceable internationally, while any domestic legislation purporting to treat 
a relevant provision in a trust instrument as an ‘arbitration agreement’ leading to an ‘award’ 
would not have international effect.”163 He argues that beneficiaries that are minors or have not 
yet born or ascertained, are not bound by the arbitration clause. Moreover, he argues that those 
problems “cannot be avoided by any provision in the trust instrument purporting to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court by having some other person or body resolve the matter except under a 
statutory arbitration procedure.”164 Under the disposition of current laws this is a due process 
issue, and as HAYTON points out, it “can be regarded as a matter of fundamental public policy, or 
as being repugnant to the concept of ownership of property to grant a person a property right 
and then purport to prevent such person enforcing his full proprietary rights by recourse to the 
courts.”165 
 
For this issue, HAYTON offers two solutions; the first one is “leave it to the good sense of the 
arbitrator to provide for due process and a fair hearing by appointing appropriate skilled 
independent persons to represent minors and unborn and unascertained beneficiaries.” That is 
what is going to happen in most jurisdictions. The second one, and his proposal, is the need of 
legislation on this matter is to create “some procedure for independent non-conflicted 
representatives to be appointed at an early stage to look after the interests of minor, unborn and 
unascertained beneficiaries and to have full authority to agree a mediated solution of the 
dispute.”166 
 
 
5. Conclusion: The need of legislation 
 
Professor Henry S. ZIEGLER, in his introduction to The International Academy of Estate and Trust 
Law Conference of 2000 suggested that “[i]f the concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the 
family wealth context is an appealing one, it would seem that some additional legislation is 
required in order to make it truly effective.”167 I could not agree more. Applying the three 
theories described (the Contract Theory, the Intention Theory and the Benefit Theory) it is a 
forced conclusion that the missing part of this structure is progressive legislation. In comparison 
with litigation, over the last decades Arbitration has evolved and become the preferred method 
of dispute resolution. At the same time, trusts have been described as an incredible useful and 
flexible device, but trust litigation has been strongly criticized. Both the arbitration method and 
                                                 
163 David J. HAYTON (2001), “Problems in Attaining Binding Determinations of Trust Issues by Alternative Dispute 
Resolution”, in Rosalind F. ATHERTON (Editor), Papers of The International Academy of Estate and Trust Law - 2000, 
Kluwer Law International, p. 12. 
164 HAYTON (2006), Future trends, supra note 28, at 71. 
165 Id. at 59. 
166 Id.  
167 Henry S. ZIEGLER (2001), “Introduction to Part I: Settlement of Disputes in Estate and Trust Matters through 
Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution”, Rosalind F. ATHERTON (Editor), Papers of The International 
Academy of Estate and Trust Law - 2000, Kluwer Law International, p. 4. 
 27
InDret 3/2008  Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández 
the trusts devices represent two of the most important legal features of the twentieth century, in 
terms of commerce, business and, more importantly for this paper, the private wealth planning 
and transfer to future generations. 
 
The developments in Hawaii and Florida and the international jurisdictions examined, 
particularly Malta and Guernsey, reflect a tendency to reconcile trust law and arbitration. 
Moreover, the institutional approaches in the United States and in the international arena 
recognize the advantages and the need of a statutory revision, and their effort has started to 
produce fruits. But there is still much to do. The need of legislation has been discussed in the 
United States168 and in international forums.169 Perhaps one way to promote the use of binding 
arbitration in trusts and enforcing the clauses in existing trusts is to basically include a norm in 
model laws. It could be either in the Uniform Probate Code or in the Uniform Trust Code. 
Another similar approach, from the arbitration point of view, is to amends the contractual notion 
of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (R.U.A.A.). 
 
Austin Wakeman SCOTT once said that “[a]s long as the owner of property can dispose of it in 
accordance with his legitimate wishes, the great adventure will go on. The law of trusts is living 
law.”170 It is time to improve the methods of resolving trusts disputes, with the recognition of the 
settlor’s authority to enforce arbitration. 
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